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function. As Professor Preble Stolz has argued, there are good rea-
sons for being concerned about the state courts when it comes to 
correcting errors of federal law: 
The lack of effective supervision over state courts in their enforcement of fed· 
era) law is much riskier than is the de facto final lawmaking power of the federal 
courts of appeals .... Numerous intangible factors tend to make federal judges 
loyal to the influence as well as the command of the Supreme Court. . . . In con· 
trast, there is relatively little beyond the constitutionally required oath that binds 
the more than 200 state supreme court judges to the United States Supreme 
Courtl5 
Yet in the name of federalism, the Court in recent decades has 
often cut back on the extent to which federal lower courts can re-
view or forestall state court error on matters offederallaw.16 When 
the Court construes narrowly federal habeas corpus and civil rights 
statutes allowing federal trial courts to enforce vital federal rights, it 
often leaves itself as the only available federal forum for the correc-
tion of possible state court error. Before the Justices or the rest of 
us accept any proposal to reduce further the extent to which the 
Supreme Court can correct error in individual cases, we should take 
into account how well the rest of the system protects litigants 
against error and injustice. 
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA. By Lee C. 
Bollingert New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1986. 
Pp. 295. $19.95. 
James Magee2 
Nearly a decade ago, the highly publicized Skokie case 
presented one of the most dramatic and controversial free speech 
issues ever to arise in American courts. It involved an attempt by a 
few dozen members of the National Socialist Party to march 
through the streets of Skokie, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago inhab-
ited by some forty thousand Jews of whom several thousand were 
15. Stolz, Federal Review of State Coun Decisions on Federal Questions: The Need for 
Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 959-60 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
16. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (excluding fourth amendment claims 
from federal habeas review of state convictions in most cases); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971) (requiring more than irreparable harm for federal court to enjoin pending state crimi-
nal prosecution). 
I. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware. 
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survivors of Nazi concentration camps. The United States Supreme 
Court refused to review the lower courts' conclusions that the first 
amendment provided constitutional protection to the inhumane 
Nazi messages. The judges in Skokie were at pains to denounce 
Nazi doctrines as utterly evil. Yet they felt bound to protect expres-
sion of these doctrines; the first amendment, they insisted, dictated 
that result. 
The Skokie controversy led many observers to reconsider the 
purposes and scope of freedom of speech. Such a reconsideration is 
precisely the aim of Professor Lee C. Bollinger's book. About Sko-
kie he says: "Here individuals were advocating an ideology the 
country had invested incalculable resources only a few decades ago 
to defeat; now it was being protected in its efforts to resurrect itself. 
Surely, many wondered, there is something disturbingly anomalous 
about that." The judicial opinions in Skokie, he says, "convey a 
strong sense of helplessness on the part of the judges. The domi-
nant image suggested by the opinions is that of judges compelled to 
reach the results they did." Although Professor Bollinger finds rea-
sons, derived from his own theory of free speech, to protect the ex-
pression in Skokie, he is dissatisfied with "the current explanations 
and theories for the modem concept of freedom of speech, particu-
larly as they apply to cases involving what we think of as extremist 
speech." 
I 
Is it possible to discern or even to imagine a general theoretical 
principle that will integrate the disparate decisions of the Supreme 
Court since its first serious encounter with the first amendment in 
Schenck v. United States? Do we have (or have we ever tried to 
develop) a similar theory, for example, of the commerce clause? 
Constitutional law tends to be an accumulation of policy choices 
made over time by judges responding to a variety of lawsuits in 
which important societal interests conflict. Sometimes these choices 
form a consistent pattern; but often they do not. The complete in-
coherence of commerce clause decisions between 1890 and 1937 ex-
emplifies constitutional inconsistency; the judiciary's partial 
withdrawal from the commerce field is probably the only reason 
that a more consistent pattern has existed since 1937. The highs 
and lows of the Court's roller coaster adjudication of free speech 
claims of the last five decades would seem to foreclose any possibil-
ity of theoretical integrity in that realm as well. 
Bollinger's goal is less ambitious and thus more realistic. In-
stead of trying to reconcile all the decisions, he wants to find a prin-
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ciple that will justify freedom of expression, particularly in cases 
involving "extremist" speech that is "unworthy of protection in it-
self and might very well be legally prohibited for entirely proper 
reasons." 
Before he fully articulates his own free speech principle, Bollin-
ger dissects and rejects what he sees as the two prevailing rationales 
for modem first amendment jurisprudence. 
THE CLASSICAL MODEL 
He begins with the "classical" defense of freedom of speech, 
which he finds evolving from John Milton's Areopagitica to Harry 
Kalven's laudatory evaluation of Justice Brennan's opinion in New 
York Times v. Sullivan. Contributors to the progress of the classical 
theory have included such notables as John Stuart Mill, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Zechariah Chafee, Louis Brandeis, Alexander 
Meiklejohn, and, of course, Kalven and Brennan. 
Their "classical" version derives from the principal preoccupa-
tions in the political thought of the Enlightenment: human reason 
and limited government. Reason could produce truth, and truth 
would facilitate wise political decisions; government, therefore, 
should not stifle freedom of expression, the most reliable means of 
attaining truth and advancing knowledge. This presupposition ex-
panded inexorably to include the correlative values of individual au-
tonomy and development through self-expression. Brandeis, 
Chafee, Meiklejohn, and Brennan emphasized the importance of 
free speech as the primary vehicle to achieve "democratic self-gov-
ernment." This was the "central meaning" of the first amendment, 
according to Kalven. 
Bollinger concedes, as of course one must, that freedom of 
speech is closely associated with the quest for truth and knowledge 
and that it is essential in a democracy. Yet he has no difficulty 
discerning confusion and paradox in the classical theory, as applied 
to the extremist speech found in Skokie. Extremist speech "seeks to 
subvert the truth-seeking process"; as applied to such speech the 
classical model is "a commitment to a principle of free speech 
[which] can lead to protection of those who would advocate the 
abolition of free speech itself." 
Some defend the classical model in language that suggests that 
the first amendment's purpose is to prevent the government from 
imposing its will on the people, who should be left free to govern 
themselves. "The first amendment has not been confined," how-
ever, writes Bollinger, "to imposing limits on errant, undemocratic, 
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official efforts to control speech but on democratically sponsored 
efforts as well." 
[F]ew if any of the restrictions on free speech we have encountered over the last 
sixty years, and the rejection of which now form [sic) the basis of our First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, could be fairly described as jeopardizing the elemental struc-
ture of a democracy-or, stated another way, that the absence of these regulations 
was the sine qua non of a democratic political system. 
If the fundamental purpose of free speech is to guarantee self-
government, does it make sense to prohibit the people of Skokie 
from preventing intentional Nazi bombardment of the fragile sensi-
bilities of vulnerable survivors of the holocaust? Of course, we can 
say that by constitutional design in the first amendment the people 
have denied themselves the right to make these decisions; but that 
seems little better than saying that the people have denied them-
selves the right to preserve self-government. 
Not content to make telling criticisms of the classical model, 
Professor Bollinger cavalierly brushes aside some of the architects 
of modern free speech jurisprudence. He hardly mentions Thomas 
Emerson, and dismisses Justice Black's first amendment jurispru-
dence as mere "legerdemain."3 Moreover, Holmes's "free trade in 
ideas" metaphor strikes Bollinger as ridiculous: "Holmes's proposal 
that truth will naturally emerge victorious ... [has] the Pollyan-
naish claim that the truth will always win out as a natural result of 
evolutionary processes. . . . " 
The pithy Holmes may be justly criticized for metaphors that 
glided past some tough issues. But we should not oversimplify his 
thought. He never asserted what Bollinger attributes to him, at 
least not in his "classic" dissent in Abrams v. United States. Bollin-
ger quotes it at length: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own con-
duct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can 
be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
Although Bollinger's quotation stops here, Holmes continued: 
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have 
to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. 
It is difficult to comprehend how any sensible reader can de-
duce from the sentiments expressed in these passages a conviction 
3. My own views on Justice Black are set forth in J. MAGEE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: 
ABSOLUTIST ON THE COURT (1980). 
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that the "natural result" of evolutionary forces is that truth will 
"emerge victorious." Holmes gave no assurance that truth will al-
ways be reached, but only that the "competition of the market" is 
the best test of truth, better than censorship, and "that at any rate is 
the theory of our Constitution." A moral relativist, Holmes could 
hardly have been Bollinger's Pollyanna; indeed his letters reveal 
that he had difficulty justifying freedom of speech.4 
Nevertheless, Bollinger is correct when he says that the classi-
cal model provides little assistance to those who grapple with cases 
involving extremist speech, the purpose of which is ultimately to 
destroy the values that the classical model enshrines as fund-
amental. 
THE FORTRESS MODEL 
"[A] more complex and less naive understanding of the role of 
free speech in modem society," Professor Bollinger continues, is "to 
secure the boundary of protected speech at some considerable dis-
tance from the speech activity we truly prize." The goal is to erect 
a fortress around the valuable speech that merits protection. The 
price to pay, of course, is the protection of socially undesirable 
speech. Whereas the classical model built upon the assumption 
"that people are rational, capable, and worthy of trust, ... [t]he 
fortress model builds upon an opposite vision of people-that they 
are moved by irrational impulses and are not to be trusted, not, at 
least, when it comes to deciding what the limits on speech activity 
within the society should be." The open marketplace in which the 
people engage in the "free trade in ideas" therefore becomes 
suspect. 
Bollinger illustrates the fortress model with an argument from 
the prologue to Aryeh Neier's book, Defending My Enemy, in 
which Neier, as a Jew and executive director of the American Civil 
Liberties Union during the Skokie litigation, sought to justify the 
ACLU's role in defending the Nazi march. Neier's position, Bollin-
ger explains, is basically "a matter of self-protective political strat-
egy, a response to a perceived reality of ever-threatening intolerance 
and prejudice by the politically powerful against the politically 
weak." The fortress model creates a legal principle as "a refuge, but 
one oddly secured by admitting into it the archenemy. . . . From 
4. "I wonder if cosmically an idea is any more important than the bowels," Holmes 
once wrote in a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock. As quoted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR: WHAT MANNER OF LIBERAL? 97 (D. Burton ed. 1979). "The theme of the 'unknowable' 
runs through his letters as it runs through his speeches," Daniel Boorstin has written. /d. at 
133. Bollinger himself tells us that Holmes saw the basis of freedom of speech "as a commit· 
ment to an intellectual stance of self-doubt." Can we discern a Pollyanna here? 
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this fear of being a persecuted minority the fortress model derives 
its appeal." 
Bollinger concedes the obvious, if troublesome, allure of the 
fortress model. It provides legal shelter against the surges of intol-
erance that too frequently impel the actions of those wielding polit-
ical power. While the classical model, when stripped of its florid 
rhetoric, appears irrelevant and contradictory, the fortress model 
does account for extreme cases and deals more realistically with the 
characteristics of mass society. 
It offers a way of conceiving of free speech at the outer perimeter that is comprehen-
sive and unblinkingly realistic. It offers a practical, pragmatic perspective of the 
world. It is conscious of the threat of conflict within the society and of the need for 
barriers to keep power from falling into the hands of those who will be inclined to 
sacrifice freedom for orthodoxy. It focuses, furthermore, on the process of present-
ing the free speech principle, not just on the particular results to be reached. 
With the fortress model, "[y]ou have at least preserved something 
of value, and possibly the activity you have thus preserved will itself 
become a means of dealing effectively with the larger phenomenon 
of intolerance, if only by offering the opportunity to notify one's 
allies of the approaching danger in other areas." 
The fortress model tends to justify an absolutist first amend-
ment standard. It confers constitutional protection upon loathsome 
speech. It can explain, if not justify, some of the courts' more ex-
treme libertarian decisions. 
While he recognizes its appeal, Bollinger finds the fortress 
model "seriously incomplete." "Probably the most serious cost of 
the fortress approach is the problem of introducing an unattractive 
elitist outlook into free speech thinking and analysis." That is, the 
fortress model envisions a "we" and "they," and thus "alienation 
between groups. Free speech becomes a divisive force within the 
community." The strategy of the model generates "a warfare 
mentality" and "can rest on a highly troublesome conception of so-
cial reality." "While the fortress perspective may not be dismissible 
as irrelevant to the actual world we inhabit, or as illogical, there 
may be other and better means of securing the ends we seem to be 
seeking through the idea of free speech." Besides, "the fortress 
model simply does not account for all that we derive from the prin-
ciple, especially when it is applied at the extremes." 
Bollinger never explains why or how the fortress model might 
create a "warfare mentality." Do people degenerate into "we/they" 
groups because of a scholarly theory? Does society pay attention to 
the intricacies of theoretical models or the reasoning employed by 
lawyers and judges to settle difficult first amendment issues? Profes-
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sor Bollinger's elaborate discussion does not extend to these obvious 
questions. He merely assumes that allegiance to the fortress model 
has divisive effects. It is difficult to see why this should be so. 
II 
The rest of the book is devoted to Bollinger's own "general 
tolerance theory," most if not all aspects of which, he concedes, can 
be found in earlier writings. Various forces, however, (such as the 
unending rhetoric about liberty and self-government) have worked 
to submerge or diminish the primacy of the tolerance ethic which 
he insists is at the heart of the free speech enterprise in America. 
Thus, while his theory is rooted in earlier justifications, it has not 
been the articulated centerpiece of first amendment writings. 
Bollinger envisions freedom of speech, not so much as a mani-
festation of individual freedom recognized as fundamental by the 
Constitution and enforceable by courts, but as a social phenomenon 
with tremendous potential to create and shape a community. "In 
this view the social function of free speech is to provide a focus on 
the mind behind the act of intolerance [that moves to suppress 
expression] rather than to protect the activity of speech itself as 
something that possesses independent value." Proper toleration of 
speech, especially extremist speech, can generate a way of thinking, 
a social character that encourages tolerance in other areas of social 
interaction. "In that role free speech is a complex enterprise that 
has a more involved function than preventing governmental inter-
ference in the democratic process, maximizing the flow of data, or 
protecting the rights of speech for minorities against tyrannical ma-
jorities." The concern is not with the worthiness or value of partic-
ular expression but "something potentially problematic in the 
public response to speech acts." 
Free speech cases-especially those like Skokie-provide pub-
lic drama in which the virtue of tolerance competes with the natural 
human impulse toward intolerance; toleration here teaches society 
general tolerance elsewhere, in other dimensions of collective 
human existence. Toleration helps to define the community and its 
values. Advocates of the fortress model seek a fixed, nearly absolute 
standard that would protect expression and avoid litigation; for 
them Skokie was an easy case. Yet Bollinger carefully reminds us 
that excessive tolerance can "destroy the collective bonds that nor-
mally hold society together." Moreover, litigation should be seen 
"as an opportunity rather than a reason for distress. . . . [It] pro-
vides the framework, the occasion, for the community to think 
about the things free speech is intended to raise for thought." Sko-
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kie, for instance, provided the occasion for a dramatic lesson in tol-
eration; the occasion was lost, according to Bollinger, because of 
what he regards as a nearly mindless rejection of the asserted social 
interest in suppressing the Nazi march. Such dogmatic decisions 
reflect an intolerant defense of tolerance which exhibits "precisely 
the intolerant mind that the [tolerance ethic] is intended to point up 
and condemn." 
The obvious alternative to "dogmatic" first amendment juris-
prudence is "balancing the interests." Many liberals object to bal-
ancing of interests in free speech cases, partly because of the 
subjectivity (and hence unpredictability) of that endeavor, but also, 
and more importantly, because of the Supreme Court's abuse of the 
balancing approach during the dismally intolerant years of Mc-
Carthyism.s Bollinger wishes to resurrect balancing to serve as the 
technique for resolving speech cases through the nurturing of the 
tolerance ethic in American society. "The recognition of complex-
ity," he explains, "ought to be the first rule ... of effective free 
speech application. Judges may distinguish themselves from other 
decision makers in the degree to which they are able to engage in 
that recognition." In discussing balancing and the limits on speech, 
he says: 
The starting point would seem to be this: Certain extraordinary times and condi-
tions exist in any society in which it is quite simply too much to expect of people 
that they be self-restrained toward speech behavior, and under which it would be 
counterproductive to the aspirational aims of free speech to insist on toleration. 
"Balancing looks dangerous," Bollinger admits, "depending on 
what is being balanced." "By taking free speech according to its 
function of helping to create a tolerance ethic within the society," 
however, "that method is both transformed and rendered more 
appealing." 
III 
Professor Bollinger's theory raises a host of questions. First, 
are judges really better able than other politicians to develop the 
tolerant mind necessary to do the job Bollinger assigns them? Sec-
ond, how will we overcome the notorious faults of balancing tests? 
While he discovers virtues (presumably, flexibility and discretion) in 
the ambiguity of balancing doctrine, Bollinger offers very little gui-
dance for courts. This is particularly disturbing in a book that be-
gins by asserting that tolerance itself sometimes "constitutes moral 
5. See generally Alfange, The Balancing of Interests in Free Speech Cases: In Defense 
of an Abused Doctrine, 2 L. TRANSITION Q. 35 (1965). 
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weakness and is itself properly to be condemned." The book offers 
very few details and refers to maybe a dozen cases, but, with the 
exception of Skokie, in only marginal ways. How, for example, are 
judges to resolve speech cases in which both sides are intolerant? 
"As with everything," writes Bollinger, "good things may be 
done for the wrong reasons, and with free speech the reasons are 
what matter most." Thus inquiry into motivation is essential to the 
operation of the tolerance theory. Bollinger explains that "if one 
looks not at the speech but at the motivation behind the restrictions, 
one may properly conclude that the restrictions were imposed for 
bad reasons." Yet earlier in the book he had rejected judicial scru-
tiny of motivation: "It is simply too difficult to make a case-by-case 
examination of legal restraints on speech to ascertain whether the 
underlying motivations are of an improper variety. The problem of 
the impulse to excessive intolerance is simply too elusive for that 
type of scrutiny." 
Bollinger's abstractions must confront some hard, challenging 
data. One very plain problem with his theory can be seen in the 
Skokie case itself. The American Civil Liberties Union's decision to 
support the Nazi group led to massive defections from its ranks and 
a corresponding financial loss of over $500,000. If the impulse to-
ward intolerance can be exposed within the country's most forceful, 
articulate, and organized advocate of individual rights, is it plausi-
ble that judicial declarations in favor of extremist expression will 
wear down the deeper and broader base of intolerance among the 
general public? The evidence seems to be overwhelmingly against 
such a possibility. 
Although badly disfigured by a combination of militant social 
intolerance and timid judges in the 1950s, freedom of speech was 
renewed and flourished in the 1960s under the Warren Court. Most 
of the Warren-era decisions survived the tenure of the Burger 
Court. If Bollinger's thesis is empirically valid, then presumably 
Americans are now more tolerant than they were before the Court's 
lessons in tolerance. Yet the evidence suggests otherwise. Prior to 
this resurrection of freedom of speech, during the end of the Mc-
Carthy era, social scientists examined the American public's atti-
tudes toward tolerance and civil liberties. Herbert McClosky was 
one researcher who discovered that the American public then was 
not very tolerant of anything other than orthodox political and so-
cial opinions-where the first amendment, of course, is ordinarily 
not needed.6 More than a generation later, in the wake of unprece-
6. McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. PoL Sci. REV. 
361 (1964). 
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dented legal protection for freedom of speech, one would expect a 
wider and deeper diffusion of the toleration ethic-assuming the 
validity of Bollinger's argument that protection of controversial 
speech helps to create a tolerant public. 
The unpleasant truth, however, is that the general public has 
been unable to learn the tolerance ethic even in the narrow area of 
freedom of speech itself, much less in the broader realm of non-
speech behavior. In a recent book McClosky and Alida Brill arrive 
at conclusions about toleration in America that are not significantly 
different from the depressing assessment which McClosky had 
made a generation earlier.7 While the public today, as before, over-
whelmingly supports freedom of speech as an abstract ideal, it ex-
hibits an intolerant mind when that ideal is applied to concrete (and 
hardly extremist) examples of expression. 
The contemporary data compiled by McClosky and Brill 
demonstrate persuasively that "freedom of speech is, in the public 
mind, a more tenuous right than one might infer from the nearly 
universal endorsement it receives when stated in its abstract form."s 
For example, only 23 percent would allow a group access to a pub-
lic building to make a speech denouncing the government; almost 
half would deny foreigners who dislike or criticize the American 
government entry into the United States. In the area of symbolic 
expression, "only a small minority of the general public (about one 
in four) are willing to endorse the right to make political statements 
by means of dramatic or shocking actions. Even actions which ap-
pear to be relatively harmless are not widely tolerated." If a profes-
sor at a university were "suspected of spreading false ideas" in the 
classroom, nearly 80 percent of the population would "send some-
one into his classes to check on him. "9 
These findings raise grave doubts about Bollinger's tolerance 
theory. Assuming that tolerance toward speech teaches us other 
forms of tolerance (a connection which Bollinger never empirically 
demonstrates), we must first cultivate toleration of freedom of 
speech itself. The general population, it seems, has learned very lit-
tle toleration since the 1950s, despite many libertarian judicial deci-
sions. McClosky and Brill conclude, moreover, that the American 
public's general intolerance toward expression is evident in nearly 
every dimension of behavior which we tend to regard as falling 
within the framework of civil liberties.w 
7. H. McCLOSKY & A. BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS 
BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983). 
8. /d. at 54. 
9. /d. at 52-54, 108. 
10. /d. See ch. 9. 
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This is not to say that Professor Bollinger is wholly mistaken. 
The general public does not appear to have become more tolerant, 
but opinion leaders may be different. Indeed, there is a wide chasm 
between the tolerance level of opinion leaders and that of the mass 
public. II Perhaps there is no tolerant society, but instead a tolerant 
elite. 
What if we were to revise Bollinger's hypothesis, making the 
courts the educators of elites, and presuming that the elites-having 
been taught tolerance by the judges-will help to create a more tol-
erant society? As thus revised, the theory would be more difficult to 
refute, but it would remain highly conjectural. Since the 1960s very 
important progress in promoting tolerance has been made on sev-
eral fronts: civil rights, women's rights, gay rights, and the rights of 
the handicapped and mentally ill, to mention only the most conspic-
uous examples. Whether and how these advances are attributable 
to judicial pronouncements in free speech cases is difficult to 
document. 
Despite the free speech decisions of the past few decades, 
America is now witnessing growing intolerance for some of the pro-
gress made in combating racial bias, frightful reminders of which 
have been catapulted into headline news. Eruptions of widespread 
racial bigotry and violence have been reported throughout Ameri-
can college campuses, at both elite private and large state universi-
ties, where the tolerance ethic is theoretically the sine qua non of 
academic existence. Some commentators correlate these incidents 
with a more overtly racist atmosphere in the country in the 1980s, 
manifested in the racial confrontations in Forsyth County, Georgia, 
and in the Howard Beach section of New York City. 
Meanwhile, conservatives complain that conservative speakers 
are shouted down when they try to address audiences in our elite 
universities. 
How does Professor Bollinger's theory explain this apparent 
undoing of tolerance? Perhaps increased judicial protection for ex-
tremist speech, as in the Skokie case, encourages intolerance. Or 
perhaps, as McClosky's polls suggest, free speech decisions do not 
affect public attitudes. Either of these hypotheses seems at least as 
plausible, and as consistent with the evidence, as Professor Bollin-
ger's theory. 
II. /d., passim. 
